Given the significant strategic importance of the Pacific Island countries and the growing competition between Japan and China for influence in these countries, Tokyo hosted the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) from July 16 to 18, 2024. The meeting was attended by Japan and 18 member countries and territories of the Pacific Islands Forum, a mechanism that was first launched on a Japanese initiative in 1997 and is held regularly in Tokyo once every three years. The latest summit, co-chaired by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown, discussed a number of important issues and challenges, notably economic development, security, and climate change.
Timing Dimensions
The 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting was held at a very important time. This can be explained as follows:
1. Security and military rapprochement:
Japan has long worked to strengthen its relations and alliance with the Pacific Island countries, providing support in many areas. In recent years, Japan and the Pacific Island countries have moved to expand their security and defense cooperation. Tokyo is working to enhance the maritime surveillance capabilities of these countries, as well as their ability to confront climate and geopolitical risks, in addition to exchanging views on common security challenges and threats. In this context, the Japanese Ministry of Defense hosted the second round of defense dialogue talks between Japan and the Pacific Islands on March 19 and 20, 2024, during which Kihara presented the "Cooperation Concept for United Security Efforts in the Pacific Islands Region" as an expression of Japan's vision for strengthening defense and security cooperation in the region. The first round of defense dialogue was held virtually in September 2021, emphasizing the importance of enhancing mutual understanding and building trust between defense authorities in the face of regional security challenges.
2. China strengthening its relations with Pacific Island countries:
China has worked in recent years to strengthen its relations with the Pacific Island countries through various tools and mechanisms. This is notably through increasing economic and development assistance, diplomatic visits, and security and defense cooperation. The most prominent indicators of the growing relations in recent times have been manifested in the increasing Chinese influence in the region through the launch of diplomatic relations between China and Nauru, after the latter announced in January 2024 the severance of its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This is in addition to the visits of the Prime Ministers of Vanuatu, Charlot Salwai, and the Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, to China in July 2024.
3. Strained Sino-Japanese relations:
Relations between Beijing and Tokyo have witnessed tension for several years due to the divergence of the countries' stances on many of the core issues related to their bilateral relations; especially the Japanese stance on the Taiwan crisis, which China sees as a bias towards what Beijing calls "Taiwan independence forces." The latest indicators of tension were China's call on Japan to play a constructive role in maintaining peace, stability, and development, and not to act as a "vanguard" for the expansion of the NATO in the Asia-Pacific region. This came in response to the new defense white paper issued by Japan on July 12, 2024, which referred for the first time to the military exercises conducted by China around the island of Taiwan as part of what it described as "Beijing's invasion strategy." China expressed its strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to the white paper. Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin considered that it "dangerously interferes in China's internal affairs, seeks to promote the narrative of the 'Chinese threat' once again, and exacerbates regional tensions." The summit also came in the wake of the NATO summit in Washington from July 9 to 11, 2024, which considered China a threat, and was attended by Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, all three countries that compete with China for influence in the Pacific Islands region.
Motivations for Interest
There are numerous considerations and motivations to why Japan and China are keen to strengthen cooperative relations with the Pacific Island countries. This can be explained as follows:
1. Japanese interests:
Japan has many important interests in the Pacific Island countries and regions. At the forefront is maintaining unhindered access to sea routes across Oceania, for both naval and commercial vessels. Ships carrying Japan's energy imports pass through the shipping routes surrounding the Pacific Island countries. Japan also imports natural resources from the Pacific Island countries and relies heavily on the fisheries located in the exclusive economic zones of these countries. In addition to the important role played by the Pacific Island countries in various multilateral international forums that are based on the legal equality of member states regardless of their size, Japan hopes to garner the support and endorsement of these countries for its initiatives. These include respecting the law of the sea and the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as reforming the United Nations Security Council, and supporting its vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, it is in Japan's interest to maintain good relations with the Pacific Island countries in order to balance China's growing regional influence in these countries.
2. Chinese interests:
The Pacific Island countries have a significant strategic location, especially their control over large maritime areas and their proximity to trade and maritime routes in the Pacific Ocean. This makes them of great strategic importance to China, despite their small geographical size and small economies. This has led China to work on increasing its diplomatic influence in many of these countries. They also represent significant long-term security importance for China. The People's Liberation Army aims to develop its maritime strategy, which may extend to establishing military bases on islands close to China.
Multiple Facets of Competition
Japan and China are competing for influence in the Pacific Island countries in numerous areas. The most prominent features of this competition can be explained as follows:
1. Mutual criticisms:
In the context of its competition for influence with China, Japan has been working to push the Pacific Island countries to adopt stances that reject what Tokyo sees as attempts by Beijing to use force to change the status quo. This was embodied in the joint statement issued at the end of the summit; Japan and these countries expressed their strong rejection of any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by threat or use of force or coercion, in an implicit reference to Chinese moves in the Asia-Pacific region. In response to this position, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called on Japan and other Pacific countries to help promote peace, stability, and development in the region instead of criticizing China. The official Chinese newspaper, Global Times, also accused Japan of using the summit for "economic enticement" and exerting "political and military pressure" on Pacific countries to conform to its wishes.
2. Security and military competition:
Since announcing its initiative for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region in 2016, Japan has been working to increase its security and military presence in the Pacific Island countries. The most prominent indicators were visits by the Japan Self-Defense Forces to ports and airports in these countries, and the conduct of naval self-defense force exercises with their counterparts in Tonga, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Palau. This is in addition to Japan sending self-defense forces to work in disaster relief activities in Tonga. During the recent summit, Japan and these countries agreed to strengthen defense exchanges by allowing Japanese Self-Defense Forces aircraft and vessels to stop at ports in the Pacific, and by intensifying training and defense cooperation. Japan has also worked to allay the concerns of Pacific Island countries regarding the mechanism for discharging treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant by affirming that it is safe and meets international standards. For its part, China has worked to strengthen its security and defense cooperation with the Pacific Island countries. It signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in 2022, which leaks indicated included a clause allowing China to deploy military personnel on the islands, as well as use the country as a base for aerial surveillance of other Pacific Islands and Australia. Reports also indicated that the Vanuatu government was considering allowing China to build a military base and naval facilities there.
3. Economic and development competition:
Japan, in cooperation with Australia and the United States, participates in many infrastructure development projects in the Pacific Island countries. It is also a member of the Partners in the Blue Pacific program, which was extended in June 2022 to coordinate assistance to these countries. During the recent summit, Japan and the Pacific Island countries launched several new initiatives to enhance economic cooperation. These include Tokyo's donation of a fisheries research vessel to each of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu to assist them in monitoring fisheries resources. This is in addition to the "Pacific Resilience Partnership" aiming to assist Pacific Island countries in mitigating the effects of climate change, as well as the development high-quality infrastructure in these countries, including submarine cables. In contrast, China has supported the economies of the Pacific Island countries through the Belt and Road Initiative, by providing low-interest loans to establish infrastructure projects, which has enabled it to gain expanded access to its fishing fleet. According to Chinese statistics, the value of Beijing's trade with these countries, most of which is seafood, timber, and minerals, reached $5.3 billion in 2021, compared to only about $153 million in 1992.
4. Political and diplomatic competition:
The competition between Japan and China for influence in the Pacific Island countries also extends to include political and diplomatic dimensions. To counter China's growing influence in the Pacific Island countries, Japan launched the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) mechanism in 1997, which has become Tokyo's main diplomatic tool for building relations with these countries. Japan has also worked to increase its diplomatic representation in these countries. In January 2023, it opened new diplomatic missions in Kiribati and New Caledonia, bringing the total number of Pacific Island countries where Japan has diplomatic representation to 10. For its part, Chinese diplomacy has succeeded in convincing some Pacific Island countries to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. These countries are Kiribati and the Solomon Islands in 2019, and Nauru in January 2024. Currently, eleven Pacific Island countries out of a total of 14 in the Pacific recognize the "One China" principle. China has also resorted to employing shuttle diplomacy in its competition with Japan for influence in these countries, including a tour by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in late May and early June 2022. This is in addition to holding the Pacific Islands Forum in Fiji in 2022, between 10 Pacific countries and China.
Future Scenarios
The competition between Japan and China to attract Pacific Island countries will continue in the context of the struggle for influence in this region, which will take many future scenarios. Three possible scenarios can be proposed:
1. The first scenario:
This scenario assumes a growing role and influence of Japan in the Pacific Island region, based on Tokyo's understanding of the increasingly complex situation surrounding this region. This is pushing it to work on increasing engagement and interaction with Pacific Island countries. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated at the summit that his country intends to work to upgrade its future relations with the Pacific Island countries to higher levels. Supporting the possibility of this scenario is the endorsement of the leaders of 18 Pacific Island countries and territories for more Japanese engagement in the development of the region. However, there are obstacles that may prevent the success of such a scenario. These are the lack of full endorsement by these countries of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative proposed by Japan. This is in addition to Japan's decision to release treated radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. The results announced by the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the plan's compliance with global safety standards did not receive the endorsement of all Pacific Island countries. Japan did not either sign the Pacific Resilience Facility, which is a regional financing facility with a target capital of $1.5 billion to enhance the resilience of these countries in the face of the impacts of climate change.
2. The second scenario:
This scenario revolves around the direction of the Chinese role in the Pacific Island region towards increasing in the future, in light of China's possession of the political, economic, and military capabilities that help it achieve its various goals in the context of its relations with the countries of the region. However, there are some obstacles that may hinder the success of such a scenario, mainly the political will in these countries, especially their alliance with the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which makes them hesitant to accept any increased role for China in the future; as most governments tend to cooperate with neighboring countries more than China. This is in addition to the decrease in the amount of funding provided by China to the region since 2016, in light of Beijing's focus on strengthening security cooperation with these countries, as well as the existence of three Pacific Island countries that still recognize Taiwan, namely Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu.
3. The third scenario:
The adoption of the Pacific Island countries of a neutral policy based on non-alignment with either Japan or China in the ongoing struggle between them for influence in these countries. This scenario is considered the most likely, given that these are small countries, and their keenness to avoid making any enemies, and their desire to maintain friendly relations with all countries.
The strategic importance of the Pacific Island countries and regions makes them an arena for competition between Japan and China. Each seeks to enhance its influence and position in these countries, leading to the realization of their core interests in the political, economic, and security fields. Despite the multiplicity of scenarios proposed for the future of Sino-Japanese competition in the Pacific Island countries, from increasing Japanese influence at the expense of China, or increasing Beijing's influence at the expense of Tokyo, the scenario of these countries adopting a neutral policy will remain the most likely. This is in light of the Pacific Island countries' keenness to prioritize their national interests, which was evident in the PALM10 summit recently hosted by Japan.
